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I. INTRODUCTION
We are in the midst of a revolution. The Internet, often referred
to as the information superhighway, is dramatically changing the
informational structure of our society. Of course, heated debates
often accompany drastic change, and our current technological
evolution is no different.
One of the largest contemporary issues relating to the Internet
stems from the use of encryption technology. On one hand, many
people feel that this technology has become an indispensable part
of the Internet. On the other hand, encryption sometimes thwarts
law enforcement's attempts to police Cyberspace. As a result, the
government has produced various proposals intended to balance
these competing interests. The most recent proposal, referred to as
"key recovery," has been the topic of much controversy.
The purpose of this Note is not only to summarize the encryption
debate, but also to offer new insight into an issue that may very
well shape the future of our society. For those readers who are not
familiar with the encryption debate, this Note should provide the
necessary framework to understand the issues and appreciate their
importance. For those readers who have been following the debate,
this Note will help organize the material and point out new
arguments against "key recovery."
Section II of the Note briefly describes Cyberspace and the
Internet. Section III sets the stage for the encryption debate by
defining cryptography (the study of encryption), discussing the
ways in which encryption is a necessary component of Cyberspace,
and describing the government's reasons for wanting to limit the
use of encryption. Section IV begins the analysis of the encryption
debate by introducing the government's "key recovery" proposals,1
and providing a detailed discussion of various pragmatic arguments
marshaled by opponents of "key recovery." Section V offers a more
theoretical critique of "key recovery" by arguing that a "key
recovery" system would result in the elimination of all physical
limitations on the government's surveillance capabilities. A Fourth
Amendment analysis of how courts have struggled with legal
'The government has sought to resolve the encryption debate through legislation which
would require the implementation of "key recovery" technology.
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limitations when physical barriers are removed suggests that it
would be extremely unwise to rely solely on legal limitations to
protect the privacy of United States citizens. Finally, Section VI
concludes this Note with a brief summary.
II. SETTING THE VIRTUAL STAGE-AN INTRODUCTION TO TODAY'S
INFORMATION-ORIENTED SOCIETY (CYBERSPACE & THE INTERNET)
The terms "Cyberspace" and "the Internet" are commonplace in
today's society. Indeed, it sometimes seems as if everyone is
talking about the "information superhighway" and various journeys
into Cyberspace. Strangely, as the information age comes rushing
upon us, few people can accurately define such terms.
The purpose of this Note is to help the reader understand the
potentially tremendous impact that the current encryption debate
may have on the future of our society. In order to understand
these ramifications, the reader must have a clear understanding of
the terms "Cyberspace" and "the Internet." Therefore, this next
section defines Cyberspace, discusses its revolutionary character,
and describes how the unique structure of the Internet has
contributed to the expansion of this new medium.
A. CYBERSPACE
The very word "Cyberspace" sounds like terminology from Star
Trek or some other futuristic science fiction story. Indeed, the term
was actually coined by science fiction writer William Gibson.2 One
day Gibson wandered past some arcades and was struck by the
intensity of the children who were playing the video games, noting
that "[tihese kids clearly believed in the space the games project-
ed."3 Gibson, who wrote Neuromancer on a manual typewriter,
knew very little about computers.4 Nonetheless, he eventually
concluded that everybody who used them with any frequency
"develop[ed] a belief that there's some actual space behind the
2WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).
'Next stop: Cyberspace, TIME, Mar. 9, 1998, at 172 (emphasis in original).
4Id.
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screen ... that you can't see but you know is there."' Gibson
labeled this place "Cyberspace."
More technical definitions of Cyberspace describe it as "the
conceptual space where words, human relationships, data, wealth,
and power are manifested by people using computer technology."6
But what is "conceptual space," and how is it different from any
other forum in which human relationships are manifest? The
answer to this question rests upon an understanding of computer
technology.
At the most basic level, the invention of computer technology
resulted in the birth of electronic bits. "[A] bit has no color, size,
or weight, and it can travel at the speed of light. It is the smallest
atomic element in the DNA of information."7 These bits can be
used in such a manner that very different forms of information can
be expressed within the same medium. 8 Bits can be utilized to
integrate "text, graphics, sound and video into a single computing
environment."9 This environment, commonly known as "Cyber-
space," is revolutionary precisely because of this ability to commu-
nicate diverse expressions of information. Indeed, the advent of
fiber-optic cables (which allow for bits to be transmitted even more
quickly) makes it "conceivable that a single transmission medium
could become the conduit for newspapers, electronic mail, local and
network broadcasting, video rentals, cable television and a host of
other information services. " 1°
B. THE INTERNET AND THE GROWTH OF CYBERSPACE
The ability to express various types of information within one
medium becomes especially revolutionary if that medium is
'Id.
s Michael Johns, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: Trying to Teach Old Doctrines
New Tricks, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 1383, 1383 (1996) (quoting HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE
VIRTUAL ComMuNrrY 5 (1993)).
7 Marc. D. Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care About Computer Crime, 10 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 465, 466 (1997) (quoting NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 14 (1995)).
a Id. at 466-67 (noting that bits can be made to represent a variety of atom-based objects
or analog forms of information such as speech, text music, photographs, and video).
'Johns, supra note 6, at 1388.
V0 ic Sussman, Policing Cyberspace, U.S. NEWS ONLINE, 1 19 (Jan. 23, 1995) (quoting
Robert Lorn-Revere) <httpJ/www4.usnews.com/usnews/nycu/POLICING.HTM>.
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available globally. By linking millions of computers and modem
owners around the world, the Internet provides global access to
Cyberspace and has become its most prominent part.
Perhaps the best way to understand the Internet is to study its
origin." The Internet was created by the Department of Defense's
Advanced Research Project Agency ("ARPA") in 1968."2 The goal
of "ARPA's" creation was "to establish an open and accommodating
global communications network of trusted hosts, including military
installations, university researchers, and defense contractors."3
The Department of Defense wanted these hosts to be able to
communicate after a nuclear war, so "ARPA" created a system
which did not depend upon a centralized computer. Rather, any
computer could route or re-route the information to its destina-
tion.'4
This unique structure has two important results. First, the fact
that any computer can route information makes the Internet a two-
way medium, allowing users to interact with other computers. This
interaction grants Internet users unparalleled capabilities to
retrieve information. For example "if a customer is looking to buy
a car, he or she can do research on or even take a virtual test drive
of the car, join a chat group, order the car, and arrange the
financing from a bank-all from a home PC linked to the Inter-
net." 5
Second, the fact that there is no centralized computer enables the
Internet to grow in a manner which resembles an organism.
Computers do not connect to a central location. Rather, they can
connect with any computer which is linked to the Internet. As
such, the Internet continues to grow at an exponential rate.'" In
"William A. Hodkowski, The Future of Internet Security: How New Technologies Will
Shape the Internet and Affect the Law, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 217,
221-222 (1997).
12 Goodman, supra note 7, at 482.
13 Id. at 482-483.
14 Hodkowski, supra note 11, at 222 (noting that "information is transmitted by being
bundled into discrete 'packets,' each of which is routed from source to destination
independently ... and recombined with other packets by the destination computer to
reconstruct the entire transmission").
"' Beth Davis, 500 Banking Transactions a Click Away, INFORMATION WEEK, Sept. 22,
1997, available in 1997 WL 14148023.
6 Johns, supra note 6, at 1388.
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1983, only 562 computers were connected to the Internet. Now, we
are "mov[ing] toward a billion connected [personal computers]." 7
C. SUMMARY
Hence, the invention of computer technology resulted in bits and
the capacity to express diverse types of information within a single
medium. This medium, commonly known as "Cyberspace,"
continues to grow at exponential rates due in large part to the
Internet, which allows millions of computers to communicate in a
two-way medium.
III. THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE
One of the most heated debates relating to Cyberspace and the
Internet surrounds the use of encryption technology. This section
sets the stage for the debate by defining cryptography, outlining the
justifications for the use of encryption, and describing the govern-
ment's interest in limiting the use of this technology.
A. WHAT IS ENCRYPTION?
Cryptography, the study of encryption, is an esoteric field of
mathematics whereby individuals make and break codes through
the use of mathematical algorithms.
An algorithm is a mathematical function which transforms
information from one form to another.'8 For example, the word
"code" can be changed to "frgh" by the simple algorithm "?3?" which
would result in a shift of each letter in the alphabet by three. The
letter "c" becomes "f"; "o" becomes "r"; "d" becomes "g"; and "e"
becomes "h". 9
" Intel to Focus on Networks, (visited Mar. 30, 1998) <http/europe.cnnfn.com/
digita jam/>.
Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the
Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709, 714 (1995) ("An algorithm is a more formal name for
a cipher.") (emphasis in original). See also WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 200
(1981) (defining a cipher as "a method of transforming a text in order to conceal its
meaning.").
19 Of course, complex mathematical formulas can be used (instead of the simple letter
shift above) to create a much more scrambled message.
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A cryptosystem is a collection. of different algorithms' which
enables an individual to "encrypt" a message by transforming its
original form (called plaintext") into an unreadable form (called
"ciphertext)." Anyone who later obtains possession of the
message will be unable to read it without first "decrypting" the
message--by using a "key" or by breaking the code.
The principal involved is very similar to that of a combination
lock on a safe. "If the lock is well designed so that a burglar cannot
hear or feel its inner workings, a person who does not know the
combination can open it only by dialing one set of numbers after
another until it yields."22 This technique, called a "brute force"
attack, is' costly and time consuming.23
There are several different types of cryptographic systems. For
example, in "Shared Single Key" cryptography systems, the same
key which encrypts the information can be used to decrypt it.24
However, in "Public Key" cryptography systems, there are separate
keys-one to encrypt the data and one to decrypt it.25 Under a
"Public Key" system, X can send a message to Y by looking up Y's
public key in a directory and using that key to encrypt the data.
Upon receipt, Y can decrypt the information using his/her secret
private key.
The technical details of the various types of cryptographic
systems are very complex and beyond the scope of this Note. At
this point, all the reader needs to understand is that encryption can
scramble information, thereby requiring individuals wishing to read
the material to have the appropriate key or the power and time to
perform a "brute force" attack.
o William A. Tanenbaum, Computer Security and Encryption (in the form of frequently
asked questions), at 579 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 467,
1997).
2 Anjali Singhal, The Piracy of Privacy? A Fourth Amendment Analysis of Key Escrow
Cryptography, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 189, 190 (1996).
2 Matt Blaze, Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers to Provide Adequate
Commercial Security: A Report by an Ad Hoc Group of Cryptographers and Computer
Scientists, (visited Jan. 15, 1998) <http/www.bsa.org/policy/encryption/cryptographers.html>.
23 Id.
2 Tanenbaum, supra note 20, at 581.
25 Id. at 581-582.
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B. WHY IS ENCRYPTION NECESSARY ON THE INTERNET?
The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or
money. It's run by ones and zeros-little bits of data.
It's all electrons .. . There's a war out there, a world
war. It's not about who has the most bullets. It's about
who controls the information. . . It's all about informa-
tion.26
As Cosmos, the villain in the movie Sneakers, states above,
information is a source of power and money in today's society.
Given the volume of data that individuals and businesses store and
the fact that storage is much easier in an electronic format,
computers have become modern day treasure troves. Hackers,
the technology savvy criminals who are the pirates of the informa-
tion age, often target these computer data banks. These attacks
financially threaten individuals and businesses connected to the
Internet, damage the growth potential of electronic commerce, and
place people's lives in danger. This next section discusses some of
these threats and how encryption serves to lessen the risks
involved.
1. Effecting Individual and Business Finances On-line. Nobody
knows exactly how much computer crime there really is. However,
it is clear that the Internet and Cyberspace create a realm which
is extremely lucrative for high-tech criminals. Given the size of the
Internet, even small crimes may have large payoffs. For example,
" 'Salami slicing.... involves a thief who regularly makes electron-
ic transfers of small change from thousands of accounts to his own.
Most people don't balance their ledgers to the penny so the thief
2 SNEAKERS (MCA/Universal 1992).
27 In addition to the voluminous amount of trade secrets and other corporate information
located online, there is an enormous amount of personal data contained by the government
and various private sector organizations. George B. Trubow, Protecting Informational
Privacy in the Information Society, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 521, 523. For example, the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Selective Service System, and the
Internal Revenue Service all cross reference information through the use of social security
numbers. Id. As a result, "anyone who knows an individual's SSN can amass a wealth of
highly sensitive information about that individual." Id. at 526. See also infra notes 45-47
and accompanying text (discussing personal information on-line).
1998] 675
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makes out, well, like a bandit."2' Another lucrative area for cyber-
thieves encompasses stolen services. Bob Gibbs, a Financial Fraud
Institute senior instructor, says that swiping and reselling long-
distance calling codes is big business.2
Businesses connected to the Internet are at the greatest risk.
The Computer Security Institute (CSI) recently announced the
results of its third annual "Computer Crime and Security Sur-
vey."' 0 According to CSI, sixty-four percent of the respondents
suffered from security breaches within the last year.31 Although
seventy-two percent of these respondents acknowledged suffering
financial losses, many of the victimized organizations were unable
to estimate their losses. 2 "The total financial losses for the 241
organizations [forty-six percent of the survey] that could put a
dollar figure on [their loss] adds up to $136,822,000."33
As startling as these numbers are, evidence suggests that piracy
occurs even more frequently. First, many break-ins go undetect-
ed.34 For example, in tests designed to evaluate the security of
military data banks, the Defense Information Systems Agency
("DISA") successfully broke into ninety-five percent of the Depart-
ment of Defense's ("DOD") unclassified computer systems.35  Of
these break ins, only four percent were detected. 3' Given the
military's four percent detection rate, the corresponding rate in the
civilian world is arguably quite low.37
2 Sussman, supra note 10, at 5.
2 Id. at 1 6.
' Annual cost of computer crime rises alarmingly; Organizations report 136 million in
losses (visited Mar. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Cost of Computer Crime]
<http'J/www.gosci.com/prelea1l.htm> (summarizing the report and offering a free copy to all
interested parties). CSI conducts the survey with the help of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations by soliciting "responses from 520 security practitioners in U.S. corporations,
government agencies, financial institutions and universities." Id. at 1 3. See also M.J.
Zuckerman, Cybercrime against business frequent, costly, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 1996, at LA
("Hackers and competitors broke into the computer systems of almost six of every 10 major
U.S. corporations in the past year.")
3' Cost of Computer Crime, supra note 30, at 1 5.
2 Id. at 6.
"3 Id.
' Goodman, supra note 7, at 475.
sId.
sId.
37 Id.
676 [Vol. 5:667
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Secondly, even those break-ins that are detected often are not
reported. In a confidential survey conducted in conjunction with
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, IBM,
Security Dynamics and other major corporations, thirty seven
percent of the companies did not want to involve the police and
would report the crime only if required by law.' Of these compa-
nies, nineteen percent justified their response by citing a "[c]oncern
that the crime would become public"" and eighteen percent feared
"the loss of client confidence.
" 40
Although statistics are not as prevalent, the level of piracy
worldwide is even more troublesome. In 1996, two leading
international software associations41 reported the results of the
first independent survey on global software piracy. The survey
incorporated data from eighty countries during 1994 and 1995 and
concluded that worldwide software piracy costs exceeded thirteen
billion dollars in 1995.42
As companies continue to expand their business operations
around the world, there will be increasing pressure "to exchange
sensitive information with-foreign branches, joint venture
partners, subsidiaries, subcontractors, product suppliers, and
customers ... " and as such, the risk of stolen information will
continue to increase.43 Encryption provides the lock that individu-
als and businesses need to protect the information which they store
or transfer electronically. In fact, many people agree that the "best
way to reduce many types of industrial and financial crime is to
provide ... powerful encryption [for use against] corporate spies
and thieves."" Essentially, encrypted information is not a very
tempting target because any thief who obtains such information
will be unable to read it without first breaking the code.
3 Zuckerman, supra note 30.
39 Id. at 17.
40 Id.
41 More Than $13 Billion Lost Worldwide to Software Piracy: Joint BSA ISPA Survey
Reveals (visited Mar. 11, 1998) <http'J/www.bsa.org/piracy/piracy-study95/SPA_BSA.htm.>
(hereinafter Worldwide Software Piracy) (noting the Business Software Alliance and the
Software Publishers Association to be two of the leading international software corporations).
42 Id. at 13.
' James B. Altman & William McGlore, Demystifying U.S. Encryption Export Controls,
46 AM. U. L. REV. 493, 495 (1996).
"An attack on Privacy Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1997, at A14.
1998] 677
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2. Effecting the Growth of Electronic Commerce. Reducing piracy
is not only in the best interests of those businesses which are losing
millions of dollars, but it is also vital for the growth and success of
electronic commerce. Without a secure and trusted infrastructure,
individuals are much less likely to move their private business or
personal information on-line.45  The existence of a new
trade-"Paid Internet Searcher" suggests that the reluctance to go
on-line is likely justified.46 Carole Lane, an "Internet Searcher"
and author of Naked in Cyberspace: How to Find Personal Informa-
tion Online, describes the availability of personal information in
cyberspace, saying:
In a few hours, sitting at my computer, beginning with
no more than your name and address, I can find out
what you do for a living, the names and ages of your
spouse and children, what kind of car you drive, the
value of your house and how much taxes you pay on
it.4 7
Without encryption technology, online information will become
even more vulnerable and individuals will become even more
reluctant to place information on the Internet. This reluctance
threatens to damage the growth of electronic commerce. The
President of the Americans for Tax Reform has compared the
scenario with the settling of the Wild West: if the government had
refused individuals the right to lock their front doors or place a
fence around their farms the "West would still be lawless."48
" Hal Abelson et al., The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party
Encryption (visited Jan. 15, 1998) <httpJ/www.crypto.com/key .study/report.shtml>. See also,
63 Groups Criticize Oxley/Manton Amendment in Letter to Capitol Hill (visited Jan. 15,
1998) <httpJ/www.cdt.org/crypto/legis_105/SAFE/970922_OxlMan.html> (hereinafter Group
Letter) (A diverse group of sixty-three companies argue that limiting the use of encryption
would stifle the growth of electronic commerce).
" Joshua Quittner, Invasion of Privacy, TIME, Aug. 25, 1997, at 28, 33. See also The
Stalker's Home Page: A Stalking We Go! (visited Mar. 20, 1998)
<http:J/www.glr.com/stalk.html> (providing depositories of personal information such as
social security numbers, political contributions, neighborhood maps, unlisted phone numbers,
property taxes, and postings on newsgroup chat boards).
17 Quittner, supra note 46, at 33.
"Relaxing Limits on Export of Encryption Software: Hearings on H.R. 695 Before the
House Judiciary Comm., Mar. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 154158 (F.D.C.H.). See also,
Blaze, supra note 22, at 1.1 ("The dirt paths of the middle ages only became highways of
678 [Vol. 5:667
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3. Protecting Information in Order to Protect People. Undoubted-
ly, businesses have a strong interest in protecting the billions of
dollars worth of information that is stored in computer banks; most
people would agree that the continued growth of electronic
commerce and the dream for a global economy are valuable goals.
However, these financial justifications for the use of encryption pale
in comparison to the tremendous role that encryption plays in
protecting people's lives.
"Air traffic control centers, electric-power grids, defense systems,
financial services, oil and gas producers and suppliers, telecommu-
nications networks and the stock market all operate and communi-
cate by computer."49 If encryption were not used to limit access
to such systems and to scramble all the data contained therein,
people's lives would be in serious danger. Consider the following
scenario:
A hacker breaks into the computer systems at Brigham
& Women's Hospital at four o'clock on a Monday morn-
ing. Before most of the doctors arrive to treat their
patients for the day, the malicious computer intruder
changes a number of patient files on the hospital's
central database system: surgeries slated to be per-
formed on the right leg are now switched to the left leg;
recorded blood types are altered from AB-negative to 0-
positive; warnings for known allergies to medicines such
as penicillin are electronically erased from patient's
charts; and laboratory records on HIV blood test results
are insidiously switched from negative to positive just
before patients are to receive their results.50
By rendering the information in the hospital's Central data base
unreadable, encryption protects against such attacks.
business and culture after the security of travelers and the merchandise they carried could
be assured. So too the information superhighway will be an ill-traveled road unless
information, the goods of the Information Age, can be moved, stored, bought, and sold
securely.").
" Americans For Computer Privacy: Your Privacy is at Stake (visited Mar. 20, 1998)
<httpj/www.computerprivacy.orgchoice.cgi>.
'o Goodman, supra note 7, at 466.
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4. Summary. In summary, there is an abundance of financial
crime on the Internet and both individuals and businesses need
encryption to protect information which is stored or transferred
electronically. Furthermore, informational piracy is making
consumers increasingly reluctant to place data on-line and the
failure to use encryption technology to create a secure infrastruc-
ture for electronic commerce may place the growth of cyberspace in
jeopardy. Lastly, our national infrastructure also depends upon the
Internet. Unless encryption is utilized to limit access to the
computers which run hospitals, traffic control centers, power grids,
and defense systems, human lives may be at risk. All of these
factors lead some individuals to the conclusion that encryption is
a vital component of the information age."l
C. WHY WOULD THE GOVERNMENT WANT TO LIMIT ENCRYPTION
TECHNOLOGY (POLICING CYBERSPACE)?
Despite the fact that encryption has extremely valuable uses, it
also has some serious drawbacks. The same technologies that
allow consumers and businesses to scramble financial information,
thereby diminishing the risk of piracy, can also help thieves commit
different types of crimes. Illegal activities such as money launder-
ing, fraud, stalking, gambling, terrorism, the commission of hate
crimes, and the distribution of child pornography are all easier to
accomplish when criminals are able to conceal their identities and
the substance of their on-line transactions through the use of
encryption. 2
61 Group Letter, supra note 45 (stating that encryption technologies are the "vital tools
consumers and businesses need to operate with security and privacy in the information age,
and are a cornerstone of electronic commerce").
52 Nicholas W. Allard & David A. Kass, Law and Order in Cyberspace: Washington
Report, 19 HASTINGS & ENT. L.J. 563, 573 (1997) ("[Llaw enforcement has realized that this
same encryption technology [which prevents crime] can be used to conceal money laundering,
other fraudulent or illegal transactions, or even espionage and terrorism."). See also, FBI
to parents: Internet pedophiles a serious threat (visited Mar. 11, 1998)
<http:J/cnn.com/TECH/computing/9803/11/cyber.stalkingrmdex.html> (describing how an FBI
agent pretending to be a teen-age girl signed on to a "chat room" in order to trap pedophiles.
If the pedophiles identities were disguised with strong encryption, this police tactic would
prove ineffective and children would be in danger). See also Goodman, supra note 7, at 465
(offering more descriptions of computer crime).
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Quite simply, the government wants to limit the use of encryp-
tion for fear that law enforcement will be unable to use electronic
surveillance to combat crime. As Louis Freeh, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), states, "Congress has on
many occasions accepted the premise that the use of electronic
surveillance is a tool of utmost importance in terrorism cases and
in many criminal investigations, especially those involving serious
and violent crime, terrorism, espionage, organized crime, drug-
trafficking, corruption and fraud.""3
Indeed, the FBI provides many examples of situations where
eavesdropping has been a key tool in law enforcement's successful
attempts to stop crime. For example, terrorists in New York who
were plotting to bomb the United Nations building were stopped
and convicted due to evidence obtained by court-ordered electronic
surveillance. 4 This type of electronic surveillance also played a
crucial role in World War II, as the highly sophisticated signals
intelligence (SIGINT) capability shortened the war and saved
hundreds of thousands of lives." As such, law enforcement
justifiably wants to assure its surveillance capabilities. This desire
leads the government's attack against the use of encryption.
Indeed, the FBI claims that:
[Tihe widespread use of robust unbreakable encryption
ultimately will devastate our ability to fight crime and
prevent terrorism land] will allow drug lords, spies,
terrorists and even violent gangs to communicate about
their crimes and their conspiracies with impunity. We
will lose one of the few remaining vulnerabilities of the
worst criminals and terrorists upon which law enforce-
ment depends to successfully investigate and often
prevent the worst crimes. 6
"Louis J. Freeh, The Impact of Encryption on Public Safety: Statement Before the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (visited Jan. 18, 1998) <httpJ/www.fbi.gov/
congress/encrypt4encrypt4.htm>.
"Id.
8 Decision Brief- Legislation Governing Encryption Must Protect American National
Security Interests (visited Jan. 15, 1998) <http://www.security-policy.org/papers/97-
D131.html>.
" Freeh, supra note 53, at 1 4.
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To some, the above statement teeters on the borderline of
propaganda. Drug lords, terrorists, violent gangs, it sounds as if
Armageddon is coming. However, the government correctly notes
that the structure of the Internet and the unique nature of
Cyberspace both create serious problems for law enforcement
agencies. This next section allows the reader to fully appreciate
the complexity of the encryption debate by briefly articulating how
law enforcement is already very difficult in Cyberspace and why
the government is therefore concerned about the addition of more
obstacles, such as the use of robust encryption.
1. The Internet and Interconnection. The interconnected nature
of the Internet creates problems for law enforcement trying to track
and convict criminals who commit their crimes on the Internet.
First, cyberspace provides a maze in which the computer criminals
can hide. Goodman points out that the Internet was "designed to
survive a nuclear war and provide[s] innumerable pathways for
messages to be sent; if one route [is] destroyed, the message ha[s]
to be able to 'react' and find a new path to its intended destina-
tion."57 This architecture is well-suited for military command
control operations but creates difficulties when it comes to limiting
and tracing access to informational depositories in Cyberspace. 58
In the digital world, any given information located on a computer
server is "connected to dozens, hundreds or even thousands of other
computer systems around the world."9 This web results in an
infinite number of possible paths which hackers could follow to
infiltrate a given data bank. As such, hackers can "cover their
tracks by 'looping and weaving' in and out of dozens of computer
systems around the world, masquerading as legitimate users on the
co-opted system.' Hence, law enforcement encounters a major
obstacle trying to track criminals on the Internet.
Second, the Internet is global,6 allowing for criminals to commit
crime in one country while located in another. Such activity
' Goodman, supra note 7, at 483.
Ild.
I91d. at 471.
0 Id. at 483.
", See Intel to focus on networks, supra note 17 (noting that there will soon be a billion
connections to the Internet).
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creates further problems relating to jurisdiction and extradition. 2
2. The Problem with Cyber-evidence. Another complication
pertaining to the policing of cyber-crime stems from the difficulty
of obtaining digital evidence. As noted earlier, Cyberspace consists
of electronic bits which basically have no size or weight.' As
such, the payoff of any given computer crime often can be stored on
a small disk." Unlike criminals who rob a bank or an armored
car of two million dollars in cash and face serious difficulties
storing and transporting the fruit of the crime, the cyber-criminal
can fit the stolen goods into his/her pocket. 5 If the evidence can
also be encrypted so as to be nearly unreadable, law enforcement
argues that they may never be able to collect the necessary
evidence to convict a cyber-criminal.
3. Summary. The inherent difficulties of preventing crime in
cyberspace which stem from the interconnected nature of the
Internet and the difficulty of obtaining digital evidence create
serious obstacles for law enforcement.6" Although some crime can
be stopped by business and consumer use of cryptography,"7 such
use cannot stop every type of crime. Hence, the government is very
concerned with the widespread use of encryption and feels that the
use of this technology should be somewhat limited.
IV. THE PRAGMATIC DEBATE OVER THE PROPOSED SOLUTION-
Is "KEY RECOVERY" REALLY THE KEY?
Considering the strong need for encryption and all of the law
enforcement problems this technology creates, the government is
6 2 See, Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 ViLL. L. REv. 1, 35-36 (1996)
(discussing "personal jurisdiction" in criminal cases).
See discussion infra Section II.A.
Goodman, supra note 7, at 471-72.
Id. at 472.
s, See, Dorothy E. Denning, Statement Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information (visited Dec. 5, 1997)
<httpJ/guru.cosc.georgetown.edu/-d...crypto/Denning-Baugh-Testimony.txt> (reporting that
law enforcement is having increasing problems because of criminal use of encryption. The
report was based on responses to a questionnaire which was sent to listed members of the
High Tech Crime Investigations Association and the G-Two-I intelligence list).
67 See supra Section III.B. for a discussion on the benefits of encryption with respect to
protecting against certain types of financial crime on the Internet.
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faced with three basic courses of action." First, the government
could decide to do nothing. Individuals would have access to the
strongest encryption available. This approach would result in a
decrease in certain crimes committed on the Internet-mainly the
piracy of valuable information. However, criminals would also have
access to strong encryption, and this access might interfere with
government surveillance designed to catch terrorists, money
launderers, and other criminals.
Second, the government could try to curtail the use of all strong
encryption. Even if this action is constitutional, which it may not
be,69 the government would be threatening the future growth and
use of the Internet. Without strong encryption, data sent on the
Internet would be "no more secure than a postcard,"7" and few
individuals or businesses would continue to operate under such
conditions.
Instead of following these two paths, the government has chosen
the "middle path between banning and deregulating strong
encryption."' This approach has been labeled "key recovery."
This next section briefly describes the "key recovery" and some of
the pragmatic arguments which opponents have marshaled against
the government's proposal.
A. WHAT IS "KEY RECOVERY"?
Essentially, the government is attempting to resolve the encryp-
tion debate by allowing the use of strong encryption technologies if
there is a built-in "key recovery" mechanism which will guarantee
law enforcement access to the plaintext.72
There are numerous types of "key recovery" systems, and a
detailed description of them is beyond the scope of this Note."
6 Allard & Kass, supra note 52, at 573-574 (discussing all three courses of action).
"See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 18.
70 Sussman, supra note 10, at 1 20.
1 Allard, supra note 68, at 574.
712 Recall from Section III.A. that 'plaintext" refers to the information before it is
encrypted.
' See Abelson, supra note 45 (noting that the term 'key recovery" is a generic description
encompassing various key escrow, trusted third-party, exceptional access, and data recovery
systems).
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Although these systems differ, the basic concept is the same. In
order to understand the debate, all the reader needs to know is
that any "key recovery" system has two essential elements: (1) "A
mechanism, external to the primary means of encryption and
decryption, by which a third party [i.e. the government] can obtain
covert access to the plaintext of the encrypted data;"74 (2) "The
existence of a highly sensitive secret key (or collection of keys) that
must be secured for an extended period of time."75
Basically, companies and individuals would be able to use strong
encryption as long as the cryptographic system also provided a
"key" that could decrypt the information without the knowledge of
the sender or recipient. The government or some third party would
then hold the key in escrow until law enforcement could demon-
strate a valid need for the key.76
B. PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST "KEY RECOVERY"
The Internet community has joined to oppose any "key recovery"
system and has compared the proposal to the FBI's demanding "a
front door key to every American's house, just in case a criminal
happens to be hiding out somewhere." 7 This section of the Note
summarizes the various pragmatic arguments that opponents of the
proposed legislation have marshaled against "key recovery." The
first set of arguments declare that "key recovery" is doomed to fail.
The second set of arguments 'proclaims that, given the likelihood
that any attempt at "key recovery" will fail, it would be unwise to
attempt the creation of such an infrastructure because its costs
would be enormous.
1. Imminent Doom of "Key Recovery." Most opponents of "key
recovery" argue that the system is very likely to fail. First, critics
argue that it would be technologically infeasible to build the
infrastructure that the new legislation would require to operate a
successful "key recovery" scheme. Leading cryptographers and
' Id. at § 1.2.
75 Id.
" See, e.g., Technical Assistance Draft for S909, Secure Public Networks Act, 105th
Congress, Sec. 106 (Aug. 28, 1997), available in <http'/jya.com/fbi-tad-s9O9.htm>.
7' Bill Pietrucha, ACLU Calls Encryption Actions Nightmare For Privacy, NEWSBYTES
NEWS NETwoRK, Sept. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13910671.
19981 685
19
Weinberg: Cryptography: "Key Recovery" Shaping Cyberspace (Pragmatism and T
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1998
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
computer scientists agree that "[b]uilding a secure infrastructure
of the breathtaking scale and complexity demanded by these
requirements is far beyond the experience and current competency
in the field."7' As Matthew Blaze, a principal research scientist
at AT&T Research notes, "[Ut is not clear that key [recovery] makes
any sense from a technical perspective ... Encryption is very
fragile.. . [and] it is a rather naive view to assume we can design
a key [recovery] system securely any time soon."79
Secondly, opponents of key recovery systems argue that even if
the necessary infrastructure can be built, it will prove ineffective
because "[ciriminals and terrorist groups will not use a system that
gives the government access to their decryption keys." ° Quite
simply, a criminal would not choose software "that happens to have
a way in for Uncle Sam" when other encryption technologies are
available.8'
The FBI counters this argument by pointing out that criminals
and terrorists still use telephone corporations even though it is
common knowledge that the government can, under proper
authority, eavesdrop on the conversations. 2 However, a criminal
wishing to place a phone call within the United States has a
limited number of choices with respect to service providers.
Transactions occurring on the Internet can be guarded with
encryption products obtained from anywhere in the world.83 As
such, there is a strong argument that many criminals will not use
"key recovery" cryptographic systems.
The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption: Leading
Cryptographers and Computer Scientists Report Says Government Encryption Plan is Risky
and Impractical (visited Jan. 15, 1998)<http'//www.crypto.com/key-study/> [hereinafter The
Risks of Key Recovery].
"Kate Gerwig, The Encryption Debate-What price for your online privacy?, TECHWEB
311, 1 19 (Nov. 1, 1996) <http://www.techweb.com/se/directlink.cgi?NTG19961101SO048>.
" Group Letter, supra note 45 (noting that "the FBI has admitted in Congressional
testimony that criminals will always have access to strong, unbreakable encryption").
a' William J. Cook, Scrambled Signals From Washington: The Clinton administration
wants to help companies (without hurting America's spies), U.S. NEWS ONLINE, 8 (Nov. 14,
1996) <http'/www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/14SOFr.htm> (noting that "neither NIT in
Japan nor British Telecom are required by their governments to maintain keys").
" Testimony of Honorable William A. Reinsch Under Secretary for Export Administration
(visited Jan. 15, 1998) <httpJ/wwwjyx.com/bxa073097.htm> (hereinafter Reinsch).
" Information and Data Security: Encryption Update (visited Dec. 5, 1997)
<http:www.bsa.org/policy/encryption/bsapaper.html> (noting that more than 200 foreign-
produced programs are widely available in the marketplace).
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2. The Costs of Attempting to Build a "Key Recovery" Infrastruc-
ture. As described above, there is some indication that any attempt
at establishing a "key recovery" system would be imminently futile.
In addition, it would be extremely costly to try to create such a
system.
First, there is evidence from the Information Technology
Association of America that because of current restrictions,
"American companies could lose up to 65 billion dollars
($65,000,000,000) in the export market for cryptography by the end
of the decade."' As described earlier,85 requiring "key recovery"
will likely result in even more lost business for American compa-
nies, since foreign consumers will be less likely to buy encryption
products which contain a way in for the U.S. government.
Secondly, there is fear that by providing a "back door for police,"
"key recovery" systems will introduce a new path to the information
and result in less secure systems.s In fact, many opponents of
"key recovery" describe the external means of decryption provided
by the key as a "trap door" and are fearful that hackers will utilize
the path to decrypt sensitive information. 7
Lastly, the "key recovery" system will require storage of highly
sensitive keys. These storehouses will become prime targets for
sophisticated hackers.' Given the prevalence of break-ins into
corporate and military systems and the government's poor record
of detection, some individuals feel that it would be 6xtremely
unwise to keep keys in electronic storage.8 9
S.J. Res. 29, 105th Cong. (1997) (relating to repealing export restrictions on encryption
software and hardware products). But see, Reinsch, supra note 82, at 1 16 ("Commerce and
NSA studied the foreign availability of encryption in 1995, and... did not find that claims
of widespread foreign availability of encryption products were accurate.").
See discussion infra section IV.B.2.
Abelson, supra note 45, at 1 3.1.
8 Group Letter, supra note 45, at 1 3 ("mandating trap doors in all domestic encryption
products and communication networks... will make the personal records and communica-
tions of individuals and businesses more vulnerable to hackers, terrorists, industrial spies
and other criminals.").
" Abelson, supra note 45, at 1 3.1.3.
89 See discussion infra Section III.B.1 (describing the prevalence of break-ins and the low
detection rate of the government). See also, Social Security officials insist Web info is secure
(Apr. 8, 1997) <http'J/cnn.comfTECH/9704IO8/soc.sec.internet/index.html> (noting that
officials insist that social security records located on the net are secure despite the fact that
a graduate student took only three and one-half hours to crack a code which was very similar
19981
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3. Summary. Hence, attempting to create a "key recovery"
infrastructure could cost U.S. computer companies millions of
dollars, result in less secure encryption (because of another path to
the plaintext), and render very valuable data storehouses open to
attack. It is extremely unwise to accept these risks given the doubt
that a satisfactory system can be built and the low probability that
criminals will use a "key recovery' system.
V. A THEORETICAL ARGUMENT AGAINST "KEY RECOVERY"-
THE ELIMINATION OF PHYSICAL BARRIERS AND THE INEFFICIENCY
OF LEGAL CONSTRAINTS
The aforementioned arguments against the use of "key recovery"
are very practical and quite convincing. Nonetheless, there is
another strong critique of the proposed "key recovery" system which
is more theoretical. This section of the Note asks the reader to
consider the future of our society and the effect that "key recovery"
legislation may have on that future.
This Note argues that both physical and legal limits are neces-
sary to keep the government in check and protect the freedom of
individual citizens. Allowing the government to obtain keys for
decrypting codes would be equivalent to breaking down Cyber-
space's physical limitations on government surveillance. Providing
legal restraints on law enforcement agencies is not enough,' ° as
legal limits by themselves will prove insufficient to protect
individual privacy.
Part A of this section describes how the physical limitations of
Cyberspace differ from the natural limits in the real world. Part
B describes how "key recovery" could practically eliminate all
physical boundaries on government surveillance. Finally, part C
examines how the law has struggled to protect privacy whenever
technological advances eliminate physical barriers.
to the one protecting the social security information); Computer hacker plants porno on Air
Force Web page (Dec. 13, 1998) <http:J/cnn.comfrECHI/961230/air.force.porn/index.html>
(describing the government's inability to protect the Air Force web page from pranksters who
managed to disable all of the Defense Department's web sites for over twenty-four hours by
defacing the Air Force page with pornography).
o One example of a purely legal constraint is a requirement that law enforcement
agencies obtain a valid court order before encryption keys are released to the government.
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These observations lead to the conclusion that providing the
government with "key recovery" and thereby eliminating the
natural physical barrier of encryption that has evolved as Cyber-
space has developed, would be extremely unwise. Although legal
limitations can be utilized to curtail the government's ability to
decrypt messages and spy on citizen transactions on-line, legal
limits alone are not enough.
A. HOW THE BARRIERS OF CYBERSPACE DIFFER FROM THE BARRIERS
IN THE REAL WORLD (NATURE VS. CODE)
This section posits that the constraints limiting activity in
Cyberspace are qualitatively different from the constraints limiting
activity in the real world (also described as "real space"). This
difference needs to be taken into account when discussing encryp-
tion and "key recovery" legislation.
1. Constraints in Real Space. The law is just one constraint
which regulates real space. The law tells people not to take an
object from a store without paying for it, not to drive faster than a
designated speed on the highway, and not to enter someone's house
without permission.
Nature also regulates behavior in real space. For example,
"tihat I can not see through walls is a constraint on my ability to
snoop. That I can not read your mind is a constraint on my ability
to know whether you are telling me the truth. That I can not lift
large objects is a constraint on my ability to steal."' In this way,
nature regulates behavior.
However, nature and law constrain differently. The law con-
strains by ex poste punishment.92 To a large extent, individuals
choose whether to steal or not. If they do steal, then they run the
risk of conviction and punishment.93 Nature regulates much more
directly. "One doesn't choose not to see through a brick wall for
fear of punishment that nature will visit upon such an infrac-
tion."9'
9" Lawrence Lessig, The Constitution of Code: Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of
Cyberspace Regulation, 5 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 181, 181 (1997).
92 Id.
93Id. Note the importance of choice, as evidenced by the prevalence of speeding.
4 Id.
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2. Constraints in Cyberspace. Cyberspace also has various
constraints which regulate behavior. For example, copyright,
defamation, and obscenity laws all "threaten ex poste sanction for
the violation of some legal right."95
The Cyberspace equivalent of nature is the computer code which
defines the operations occurring on the Internet. "The code, or the
software that makes cyberspace as it is, constitutes a set of
constraints on how one can behave in cyberspace."' For example,
an individual cannot log on to certain networks without entering
his/her password. Similarly, someone cannot intercept and read a
message which has been encrypted unless he/she has the key or is
able to break the code. Just as nature directly regulates real space,
computer code directly regulates Cyberspace. One cannot choose
to enter America Online without a password any easier than one
can choose to see through walls.97
3. An Important Difference. Hence, Cyberspace is much like real
space-both contain legal and physical constraints. However, the
code of Cyberspace is much more plastic than the natural barriers
of real space. As such, legislation (like "key recovery" proposals)
which attempts to regulate the code utilized on the Internet should
be viewed as trying to define the physical limits of Cyberspace.
B. KEY RECOVERY AND ITS EFFECT ON THE PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS OF
CYBERSPACE
"Key recovery" legislation mandates that all encryption systems
be written in a certain way (i.e. allowing for third-party access) and
therefore will operate as a control of the future code in Cyberspace.
This section argues that this code change will greatly diminish
current physical limitations on government surveillance.
1. Current Limitations in Real Space. Before one can under-
stand how "key recovery" would increase the government's surveil-
lance capabilities, it is important to understand what power the
government currently has in real space. Currently:
'5 Lessig, supra note 91, at 183.
'Id.
9' Although hackers can break into America Online without a password, infra-red
technology allows people to see through walls. However, both of these techniques are
exceptions rather than the norm.
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* [11f the government wants to read your mail, it has to sort
through trillions of physical pieces of paper that might be
anywhere in the country. This is difficult, time consuming,
and expensive.9"
" If the government wants to listen to your phone calls, [it
must] pay people to listen, and listening takes a long time.
Even though you can electronically sort out telephone calls
... technology is such that you still have to hire people to
listen, and this again is expensive.'
* The government cannot easily monitor... groups of people
that meet in three dimensional space-like your church,
your business, or your local bar."°
" The government cannot easily track what you do with
physical currency
°101
2. Cyberspace Surveillance. Cyberspace is popular precisely
because it lacks many of the physical barriers present in the "real
space." Internet users can skip from a web site in California to a
web site in Germany; and the computer can search thousands of
records per second for a particular key word.
Luckily, encryption has evolved as Cyberspace developed and
provides some physical limitations on government surveillance.
Quite simply, the government must expend computer time and
energy in order to break codes and read information available on-
line.10 2 If the government had a key to the code, it would be
unnecessary to expend the energy. As such, the government would
have unprecedented ability to gather all sorts of information. In
order to help the reader better appreciate this risk, the following
paragraphs describe some of the technology which already exists for
"big-brother" type surveillance and the immense power of govern-
ment computers.
The technology already exists for unprecedented surveillance.
For example, programs called "sniffers" can be commanded to look
Hearings on H.R. 695, supra note 48, at 4.
I9ld.
1D Id.
101 Id.
" See infra notes 107-114 and accompanying text for a description of the government's
superior ability to break codes.
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for signals of any sort.10 3 In 1992, a twenty-year-old schizophren-
ic boy named Matt Singer used his personal computer and a sniffer
program to accumulate hundreds of thousands of passwords and
account names.'O° By working diligently for about three months,
Singer managed to install sniffers on the major backbones of the
Internet. 10 5 With these sniffers, Matt managed to accumulate
enough information to break into "classified military sites, nuclear-
weapons labs, bank ATM systems, Fortune 100 companies, [and]
dam control systems. " "°a If a boy on a home computer can accu-
mulate that much data, then imagine the amount of information
the government could obtain with its computer resources if it did
not have to exert energy breaking encryption codes.
The government already has the world's fastest computer-an
Intel ASCI Red Unit designed to perform one and one-half trillion
operations per second and has recently awarded a four and one-half
million dollar contract to lease computer time at the Pittsburgh
Supercomputing center.' 7 The government may "set up systems
so fast that they could do 30 trillion calculations per second by
2001-and 100 trillion by 2004. ' 08
In addition to programs (like sniffers) that collect information
traveling through Cyberspace, the government has access to
"
0 See David H. Freedman & Charles C. Mann, Cracker: This computer geek could have
taken down the networks of military sites, nuclear-weapons labs, Fortune 100 companies, and
scores of other institutions. It might have been partly your fault, U.S. NEWS ONLINE, 1 28-34
(June 2,1997) <http'//www.usnews.com/usnewsissue/97060212CRAC.HTM> (discussing how
sniffers can be used to look for key words such as "merger" or "proxy" to screen for financial
transactions).
1
0 4 Id. at 1 28-35.
"' ld. The backbones are a "network of super fast communication'lines... [which form]
the interstate highway system of the Internet. Bank transactions, stock market information,
credit reports, corporate strategies, top-secret research, private E-mail, marketing numbers,
data on utilities and waste dumps and building construction-all pass through the
backbones." Id. at 1 27.
'6 Id. at 915.
107 Energy Department taps into powerful academic computers (Mar. 9, 1998)
<http'/cnn.com/TECH/computing/97803/09/nukecomputers.ap/index.html> (hereinafter
Powerful Academic Computers]. See also, Douglas Waller, Spies in Cyberspace, TIME, Mar.
20, 1995, at 63-64 (noting that the CIA's "computer system at Langley stores more than 4
trillion bytes of information--equal to a stack of documents 30 miles high. Its computer-disk
farms, which take up two floors the area of two football fields, have numbers and letters
painted on the walls, like a parking lot, so technicians don't get lost in the mainframes.").
08 Powerful Academic Computers, supra note 107, at 1 1.
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programs which can infiltrate a given system that is connected to
the Internet. One example is a "worm." "[A] 'worm' is a program
that travels from one computer to another but does not attach itself
to the operating system of the computer that it 'infects.' "' In
the fall of 1988, a first-year graduate student in Cornell Univer-
sity's computer science Ph.D. program wrote a computer program
of this nature in order to "demonstrate the inadequacies of current
security measures on computer networks."110 Because of a mis-
calculation, the worm replicated much faster than had been
anticipated"' and eventually caused many computers to shut
down, including computers relied upon by various universities,
military sites, and medical research centers." 2 Considering the
large number of computers that Morris was able to infect with one
worm program released from a single computer," 3 it is staggering
to imagine how many computers the U.S. government could
infiltrate with its high power computers. Now consider the fact
that a "worm" could theoretically be programmed to enter into
thousands of computer systems and look for specified informa-
tion."4 The ease with which the government could monitor all
material and transactions on-line is frightening.
s United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 n.1 (2d Cir. 1991).
n1 Id. at 505.
. In order to prevent the worm from copying itself onto a computer that already had a
copy (an event that would cause the computer system to bog down and crash), Morris had
the worm "ask" each computer whether there was an existing copy of the worm. Morris, 928
F.2d at 506. If the response was "no," then the worm copied itself onto the computer, if the
response was "yes," the worm was not duplicated. Id. To stop other programmers from
killing the worm by programming their computers to provide false "yes" responses, Morris
programmed the worm for automatic duplication upon every seventh "yes" response. Id.
Since Morris underestimated the frequency with which a computer would be asked the
question, his automatic duplication ratio was incorrect and the worm copied itself far more
often than Morris had intended. Id.
112 Id. at 506.
'" Id. at 505 (Morris used a computer from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
to release the worm in order to disguise the fact that he released the worm). Id. at 506.
"' See Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband: The
Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093, 1098-99 (1996) (discussing
a hypothetical government search program that could be used to detect digital contraband).
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C. LEGAL LIMITS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT
It is true that some "key recovery" legislation provides legal
limitations on the government's ability to obtain the keys. 5
Most people put great faith in these legal limitations. Indeed, our
complex system of legal rights and duties provides the necessary
order for our civilized society by facilitating interaction between
citizens and by maintaining a proper balance between individual
rights and the government power necessary to protect those rights.
Optimism demands that we feel confident in the ability of our laws
to maintain this structure. This Note was not written in order to
destroy the feeling of security that our constitutional rights provide.
Rather, the purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that these legal
boundaries are insufficient alone to maintain the necessary balance
between individual rights and governmental control. Instead, the
combination of legal and physical limitations on the government
maintains this necessary balance." 6
Past experience has demonstrated that legal limits often prove
inadequate when physical limitations are eliminated. This section
examines the Fourth Amendment and how courts have struggled
to give it full effect whenever technological advances have allowed
for law enforcement to circumvent a physical limitation on
government surveillance-focusing on wire-taps, infra-red surveil-
lance technology, and Millivision. Given that legal limits have
particular problems when physical barriers are removed, this Note
advises against "key recovery."
1. Wire-Tapping Technology-Breaking Down Physical Barriers
and Reformulating the Right to Privacy From a Property-Based
Regime to an "Expectations" Regime. Earlier this century, the
United States Supreme Court utilized a property-based analysis for
Fourth Amendment questions. Essentially, the government could
only confiscate property in which it had a superior possessory
interest. Under this approach, "[ciourts would not conclude that a
search and seizure had even taken place unless the government
15 The Risks of Key Recovery, supra note 76.
.6 The government could not possibly follow every other person around and listen to all
their conversations. Note, however, that it would be theoretically possible to listen in on
every third conversation on the Internet if encryption codes were ineffective.
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infringed a property interest."" 7 This analysis also applied to
investigative techniques which were declared unconstitutional as
a violation of the Fourth Amendment only if the technique
infringed upon a property right. 11
8
This bright line rule helped the property-based paradigm function
quite efficiently, until technological advances began destroying
some of the physical boundaries. Wire-tapping equipment enabled
the government to listen in on phone conversations without
physically entering the suspects' property. For example, in
Olmstead v. United States,"9 the government used wire-taps to
listen in on various phone conversations of individuals who were
suspected of breaking prohibition laws. Since the wire-taps were
placed on the phone lines leading into the suspects' houses, the
Court held that there was not an unreasonable search and
seizure.120 The Court explained that, "[tihe language of the
Amendment can not be extended and expanded to include telephone
wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house or
office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office
"121
The property-based Fourth Amendment analysis resulted in
similar conclusions when the government used other listening
devices. In Goldman v. United States,'2 2 the government placed
a detectaphone outside the wall of a room where the defendant was
making telephone calls. Since this manner of monitoring phone
calls did not encroach onto the suspect's property, the court held
the search to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 23
As technological advances continued to break down physical
barriers and allowed government surveillance without an encroach-
ment on property rights, the Court was forced to reassess the
.. Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 54 (1995).
218 Id. at 55.
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
'2 Id. at 464-65.
121 Id. at 465.
122 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
" Id. at 135; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506-09 (1961) (holding
a search to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment only because the "spike mike" used to
eavesdrop on defendant's conversation actually touched his premises).
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Fourth Amendment doctrine. 124  The new test involved an
assessment of the suspect's "reasonable expectation of privacy.
" 125
In Katz v. United States,'26 law enforcement officials attached an
electronic listening device outside a public telephone booth in order
to catch the defendant placing interstate gambling calls. Using the
same property-based Fourth Amendment analysis as in Olmstead,
the court of appeals affirmed the -conviction.127  The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment protects
people rather than places.' 28 The Court articulated a new test,
stating that there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment
because of the expectation of privacy that individuals usually
attach to their conversations in phone booths.'29 Thus, the test
became whether an individual had an expectation of privacy that
society was willing to recognize as reasonable. 3 °
As technological advances broke down traditional physical
limitations on eavesdropping, the Court needed to change the
property-based Fourth Amendment test to an expectation-based
test. This change appeared to solve the problem for the time being.
2. What is a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Infra-red and
Electromagnetic Detection Devices-The Elimination of Physical
Barriers Resulting in a Struggle to Define the Fourth Amendment.
The expectation-based Fourth Amendment analysis provided more
protection against the wire-tapping surveillance of the government
than did the property-based doctrine. Unfortunately, the new test
has proven to be inaccurate in light of increasing technology.
Expectations are not static; rather, they "change in the face of new
technologies, such as DNA blood testing or weapons detection."'
3
'
Indeed, how reasonable is any expectation of privacy today when
every citizen agrees to have a social security number, files detailed
descriptions of spending habits on tax forms, and completes various
124 See, Krent, supra note 117, at 56 ("fIn an era of electronic eavesdropping and forensic
laboratory testing, property no longer seemed a satisfactory proxy for the individual rights
at stake.").
125 Id. at 58-59.
'2 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134.35 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
'2 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
'2 Id. at 353.
130 Id.
"' Krent, supra note 117, at 62.
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other forms for the record? In light of the changing technology, the
Court has struggled to define what is or is not a "reasonable
expectation of privacy." During this struggle, a new standard
called the "intimate details" test may be arising."3 2
For example, consider whether individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance. The Court has
considered this question several times. 3 In its Fourth Amend-
ment examination, the Court appeared to focus on whether the
surveillance revealed any "intimate details" of an individual's
life. 1 34  The first time a majority explicitly used the "intimate
details" terminology was in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States.'s'
There, Dow's industrial complex was photographed by an EPA
aircraft using very expensive precision cameras. Although Dow had
developed an "elaborate" security system, it did not conceal all of
its equipment from aerial view. The Court held there was no
search for Fourth Amendment purposes because "the intimate
activities associated with family privacy and the home and its
curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between
structures and buildings of a manufacturing plant."' The Court
used similar reasoning in other cases to hold aerial observation to
be consistent with the Fourth Amendment as long as it did not
reveal any intimate details. 37
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted an
"intimate details" standard, lower circuit courts have noticed the
Court's terminology and have used it when examining the constitu-
'" See, Merrick D. Bernstein, 'Intimate Details: A Troubling New Fourth Amendment
Standard for Government Surveillance Techniques, 46 DUKE L.J. 575 (providing a thorough
analysis of the use of this terminology by the U.S. Supreme Court and how the lower federal
courts began using it as a test.).
13 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
" See, Bernstein, supra note 132 (summarizing the Supreme Court's use of this
terminology).
13 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
I ld. at 236 (emphasis added).
'8 See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (acknowledging in the footnote that "aerial observation
of curtilage may become invasive ... through modem technology which discloses to the
senses those intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to police or
fellow citizens.") (emphasis added). See also, Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 (upholding the
constitutionality of a law enforcement officer's observation, from an altitude of four hundred
feet, of the interior of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard).
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tionality of the newest government surveillance tactics. For
example, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and state police
have used thermal imagery to convict drug abusers. Thermal
imagery uses infrared detection to produce a visual image of an
object based on the heat which it radiates. 38 A screen then
shows various colors, which correspond to the amount of heat
produced, in slightly less detail than a television. The device does
not project any beams or physically penetrate the objects targeted,
and the infrared waves are not visible to the naked eye. 39 By
placing thermal imaging systems in airborne surveillance vehicles,
the government can survey vast areas for "hot spots" characteristic
of the high intensity lamps used for indoor growing of marijuana.
The five circuit courts which have addressed whether. the use of
this device constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purpos-
es 40 have all upheld the search as constitutional. Quite simply,
there is no "search" under the "intimate details" standard unless
intimate details are observed.
This test has been criticized as "an inquiry ex post into the
content of the information revealed by surveillance-instead of the
manner in which the information has been obtained."' Regard-
less of whether the standard is appropriate or not, the key point for
this Note is that legal boundaries are struggling as modern
technological advances call into question the concept of what
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Even if the "intimate details" standard was adopted, the
technological advance known as "Millivision" may raise doubts
about the effectiveness of that standard. "Millivision" uses passive
imaging technology to read electromagnetic radiation emitted by an
object. This data is utilized by "image understanding software" to
convert the radiation data into a visual image similar to an x-
ray. 42 So far, a Fourth Amendment analysis of Millivision would
not appear to be any different than one of thermal imagery. The
key difference between the two technologies is the software which
translates the information into the picture on the screen. With
1 Bernstein, supra note 132, at 588.
' Id. at 589.
'40 Id. at 586, n.104.
"'I d. at 577-78.
142 Id. at 600.
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Millivision, the government can use "smart software" to recognize
certain shapes such as dry powders in plastic bags. Moreover,
Millivision can be programmed not to display any information
unless it detects an item which the particular program has deemed
to be "suspicious. "143 Therefore, it is possible to run a particular
program so that Millivision automatically complies with the
"intimate details" test used by the federal circuit courts for
infrared government surveillance. Thus, the government could
theoretically use Millivision to survey all activity and no one's
Fourth Amendment rights would be violated because no "intimate
details" would be displayed on the screen.
How the Court will protect the right to privacy as technology
continues to change the boundaries of possibilities is not exactly
clear. What is clear is that legal limitations often struggle to keep
pace with the exponential advancement of technology. Given this
struggle, a "key recovery" system should not be used. Such a
system would eliminate one of the few physical obstacles that
Cyberspace provides against government surveillance and replace
that physical limitation with a legal constraint.
VI. CONCLUSION
Determining whether or not to pass "key recovery" legislation is
one of the most important decisions the legislature will ever make.
Almost everyone who is close to the debate is aware that the
decision will impact the financial well-being of businesses and
individuals in the on-line community, shape the future of electronic
commerce, and help determine how much success the government
will or will not have against cyber-criminals.
Despite the importance of these effects, they pale in comparison
to the real issue. The decision regarding key recovery is monumen-
tal because it will shape the very nature of Cyberspace. "Key
recovery" legislation will result in an infrastructure of incredible
proportions and will shape the protocol of the Internet. If the
government is successful, all encryption programs will have "key
recovery" systems. Such a scenario will allow the government to
have unprecedented surveillance capability. Thus, the author
'4 Id. at 602.
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hopes that everyone involved in the encryption debate understands
the importance of this decision.
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